John Locke, Second
Treatise of Government (1689)
Ch I: Locke asserts that the right to rule is neither
descended from God, nor through the bloodlines of "royal" families.
Sect. 3. POLITICAL POWER, then,
I take to be a RIGHT of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently
all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of
employing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the
defence of the common-wealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the
public good.
CHAP. II. Of the State of Nature.
Sect.
4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we
must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of
perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and
persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without
asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man. A state also of equality, wherein
all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another;
there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and
rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of
the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without
subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by
any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him,
by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and
sovereignty.
Sect.
6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence:
though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his
person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his
possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for
it. The state of nature has a law
of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law,
teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or
possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the
servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about
his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last
during his, not one another's
pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community
of nature, there cannot be supposed any
such subordination among us, that
may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's
uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so
by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought
he, as much as he can, to preserve
the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an
offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of
the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.
Sect. 7.
And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from
doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the
peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is,
in that state, put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to
punish the transgressors of that
law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would,
as all other laws that concern men in this world 'be in vain . . . , if there
were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law, and
thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for
any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect
equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one
over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs
have a right to do.
Sect. 8. And
thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no
absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his
hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own
will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience
dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may
serve for reparation and restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one
man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In
transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by
another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God
has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure
them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass against the
whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of
nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in
general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to
them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as
may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example
others, from doing the like mischief.
And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH
THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.
Sect. 9. 1 doubt not but this will seem a
very strange doctrine to some men: but before they condemn it, I desire them to
resolve me, by what right any prince or state can put to death, or punish an
alien, for any crime he commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction they
receive from the promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a stranger:
they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to them. The legislative authority, by which
they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth, hath no power over
him. Those who have the
supreme power of making laws in England, France or Holland, are to an Indian,
but like the rest of the world, men without authority: and therefore, if by the
law of nature every man hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he
soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the magistrates of any
community can punish an alien of another country; since, in reference to him,
they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have over
another.
Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights,
the one of punishing the crime for restraint, and preventing the like offence,
which right of punishing is in every body; the other of taking reparation,
which belongs only to the injured party, comes it to pass that the magistrate,
who by being magistrate hath the common
right of punishing put into
his hands, can often, where the public good demands not the execution of the
law, remit the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority, but yet
cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has
received. That, he who has
suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone can
remit: the damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the
goods or service of the offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man
has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the
right he has of preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can
in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature,
has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like
injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the punishment
that attends it from every body, and also to secure men from the attempts of a
criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath
given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed
upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a
lion or a tyger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no
society nor security: and upon this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso
sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced,
that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of
his brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain
was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.
Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That
in the state of nature every one has the executive power of the law of nature,
I doubt not but it will be objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be
judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves
and their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge
will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and
that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the
partiality and violence of men. I
easily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for the
inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must certainly be great, where
men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy to be imagined, that he
who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be so just as to
condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those who make this objection, to
remember, that absolute monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which
necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the state of
nature is therefore not to how much better it is than the state of nature,
where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own
case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least
liberty to any one to question or controul those who execute his pleasure and
in whatsoever he cloth, whether led by reason, mistake or passion, must be
submitted to7 much better it is in the state of nature, wherein men are not
bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges
amiss in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of
mankind.
Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty
objection, where are, or ever were there any men in such a state of nature? To
which it may suffice as an answer at present, that since all princes and rulers
of independent governments all through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain the world never was, nor ever will be,
without numbers of men in that state.
I have named all governors of independent communities, whether they are,
or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact that puts an
end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing
together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body
politic; other promises, and compacts, men may make one with another,
and yet still be in the state of nature.
The promises and bargains for truck, &c. between the two men in the
desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in his history of Peru; or
between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them,
though they are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one another:
for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of
society.
CHAP. III: Of the State of War.
Sec. 21. To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but
to heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is
no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great reason of men's
putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature: for where
there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by
appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded, and the
controversy is decided by that power.
CHAP. V: Of Property.********************
Sec. 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that
men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to
meat and drink, and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence:
or revelation, which gives us an account of those grants God made of the world
to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king David
says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the children of
men; given it to mankind in common.
But this being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty, how
any one should ever come to have a property in any thing: I will not content
myself to answer, that if it be difficult to make out property, upon a
supposition that God gave the world to Adam, and his posterity in common, it is
impossible that any man, but one universal monarch, should have any property
upon a supposition, that God gave the world to Adam, and his heirs in
succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I shall endeavour to shew, how men
might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to
mankind in common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners.
Sec. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also
given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is
given to men for the support and comfort of their being. And tho' all the fruits it naturally
produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are
produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has originally a
private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as they are
thus in their natural state: yet being given for the use of men, there must of
necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other, before they can be
of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man. The fruit, or venison, which nourishes
the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must
be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right
to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life.
Sec. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to
all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any
right to but himself. The labour
of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the
state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with,
and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property. It being by him removed
from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour
something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this
labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can
have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough,
and as good, left in common for others.
Sec. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an
oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated
them to himself. No body can deny
but the nourishment is his. I ask
then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he eat? or when
he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is
plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between
them and common: that added something to them more than nature, the common
mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right. And will any one say, he had no right
to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, because he had not the consent
of all mankind to make them his?
Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in
common? If such a consent as that
was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given
him. We see in commons, which
remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, and
removing it out of the state nature leaves it in, which begins the property;
without which the common is of no use.
And the taking of this or that part, does not depend on the express
consent of all the commoners. Thus
the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I have
digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, become
my property, without the assignation or consent of any body. The labour that was mine, removing them
out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.
Sec. 29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary
to any one's appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common,
children or servants could not cut the meat, which their father or master had
provided for them in common, without assigning to every one his peculiar
part. Though the water running in
the fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his
only who drew it out? His labour
hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged
equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself.
Sec. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who
hath killed it; it is allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed his labour
upon it, though before it was the common right of every one. And amongst those who are counted the
civilized part of mankind, who have made and multiplied positive laws to
determine property, this original law of nature, for the beginning of property,
in what was before common, still takes place; and by virtue thereof, what fish
any one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind;
or what ambergrise any one takes up here, is by the labour that removes it out
of that common state nature left it in, made his property, who takes that pains
about it. And even amongst us, the
hare that any one is hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the chase:
for being a beast that is still looked upon as common, and no man's private
possession; whoever has employed so much labour about any of that kind, as to
find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of nature, wherein
she was common, and hath begun a property.
Sec. 31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the
acorns, or other fruits of the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any
one may ingross as much as he will.
To which I answer, Not so.
The same law of nature, that does by this means give us property, does
also bound that property too. God
has given us all things richly, 1 Tim.
vi. 12. is the voice of reason confirmed by
inspiration. But how far has he
given it us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to
any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his Tabour fix a
property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to
others. Nothing was made by God
for man to spoil or destroy. And
thus, considering the plenty of natural provisions there was a long time in the
world, and the few spenders; and to how small a part of that provision the
industry of one man could extend itself, and ingross it to the prejudice of
others; especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of what might
serve for his use; there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions
about property so established.
Sec. 32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of
the earth, and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself; as that
which takes in and carries with it all the rest; I think it is plain, that
property in that too is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates,
and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, inclose it from the
common. Nor will it invalidate his
right, to say every body else has an equal title to it; and therefore he cannot
appropriate, he cannot inclose, without the consent of all his
fellow-commoners, all mankind.
God, when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man also
to labour, and the penury of his condition required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to
subdue the earth, i.e. improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out
something upon it that was his own, his labour. He that in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled
and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property,
which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him.
Sec. 33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by
improving it, any prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and
as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was never the
less left for others because of his enclosure for himself: for he that leaves
as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all. No body could think himself injured by
the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole
river of the same water left him to quench his thirst: and the case of land and
water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.
Sec. 34. God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it
them for their benefit, and the greatest conveniencies of life they were
capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain
common and uncultivated. He gave
it to the use of the industrious and rational, (and labour was to be his title
to it;) not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and
contentious. He that had as good
left for his improvement, as was already taken up, needed not complain, ought
not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labour: if he did, it
is plain he desired the benefit of another's pains, which he had no right to,
and not the ground which God had given him in common with others to labour on,
and whereof there was as good left, as that already possessed, and more than he
knew what to do with, or his industry could reach to.
Sec. 35. It is true, in land that is common in England, or any other
country, where there is plenty of people under government, who have money and
commerce, no one can inclose or appropriate any part, without the consent of
all his fellow-commoners; because this is left common by compact, i.e. by the
law of the land, which is not to be violated. And though it be common, in respect of some men, it is not
so to all mankind; but is the joint property of this country, or this
parish. Besides, the remainder,
after such enclosure, would not be as good to the rest of the commoners, as the
whole was when they could all make use of the whole; whereas in the beginning
and first peopling of the great common of the world, it was quite
otherwise. The law man was under,
was rather for appropriating. God
commanded, and his wants forced him to labour. That was his property which could not be taken from him
where-ever he had fixed it. And
hence subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we see are joined
together. The one gave title to
the other. So that God, by
commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate: and the condition
of human life, which requires labour and materials to work on, necessarily
introduces private possessions.
Sec. 36. The measure of property nature has well set by the extent of
men's labour and the conveniencies of life: no man's labour could subdue, or
appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part; so
that it was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench upon the right of
another, or acquire to himself a property, to the prejudice of his neighbour,
who would still have room for as good, and as large a possession (after the
other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated. This measure did confine every man's
possession to a very moderate proportion, and such as he might appropriate to
himself, without injury to any body, in the first ages of the world, when men
were more in danger to be lost, by wandering from their company, in the then
vast wilderness of the earth, than to be straitened for want of room to plant
in. And the same measure may be
allowed still without prejudice to any body, as full as the world seems: for
supposing a man, or family, in the state they were at first peopling of the
world by the children of Adam, or Noah; let him plant in some inland, vacant
places of America, we shall find that the possessions he could make himself, upon
the measures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day,
prejudice the rest of mankind, or give them reason to complain, or think
themselves injured by this man's incroachment, though the race of men have now
spread themselves to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely exceed the
small number was at the beginning.
Nay, the extent of ground is of so little value, without labour, that I
have heard it affirmed, that in Spain itself a man may be permitted to plough,
sow and reap, without being disturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but
only his making use of it. But, on
the contrary, the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him, who, by his
industry on neglected, and consequently waste land, has increased the stock of
corn, which they wanted. But be
this as it will, which I lay no stress on; this I dare boldly affirm, that the
same rule of propriety, (viz.) that every man should have as much as he could
make use of, would hold still in the world, without straitening any body; since
there is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants, had not
the invention of money, and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it,
introduced (by consent) larger possessions, and a right to them; which, how it
has done, I shall by and by shew more at large.
Sec. 37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of
having more than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things, which
depends only on their usefulness to the life of man; or had agreed, that a
little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay, should
be worth a great piece of flesh, or a whole heap of corn; though men had a
right to appropriate, by their labour, each one of himself, as much of the
things of nature, as he could use: yet this could not be much, nor to the
prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still left to those who would
use the same industry. To which
let me add, that he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not
lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for the provisions serving to
the support of human life, produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated
land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times more than those which are
yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness lying waste in common. And therefore he that incloses land,
and has a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he
could have from an hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety
acres to mankind: for his labour now supplies him with provisions out of ten
acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in common. I have here rated the improved land
very low, in making its product but as ten to one, when it is much nearer an
hundred to one: for I ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of
America, left to nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a
thousand acres yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies
of life, as ten acres of equally fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are
well cultivated?
Before the appropriation of land, he who
gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed, as many of the
beasts, as he could; he that so imployed his pains about any of the spontaneous
products of nature, as any way to alter them from the state which nature put
them in, by placing any of his labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety
in them: but if they perished, in his possession, without their due use; if the
fruits rotted, or the venison putrified, before he could spend it, he offended
against the common law of nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his
neighbour's share, for he had no right, farther than his use called for any of
them, and they might serve to afford him conveniencies of life.
Sec. 38. The same measures governed the possession of land too:
whatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled,
that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could feed, and make
use of, the cattle and product was also his. But if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the
ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up,
this part of the earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked
on as waste, and might be
the possession of any
other. Thus, at the beginning,
Cain might take as much ground as he could till, and make it his own land, and
yet leave enough to Abel's sheep to feed on; a few acres would serve for both
their possessions. But as families
increased, and industry inlarged their stocks, their possessions inlarged with
the need of them; but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in the
ground they made use of, till they incorporated, settled themselves together,
and built cities; and then, by consent, they came in time, to set out the
bounds of their distinct territories, and agree on limits between them and
their neighbours; and by laws within themselves, settled the properties of
those of the same society: for we see, that in that part of the world which was
first inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled, even as low down as
Abraham's time, they wandered with their flocks, and their herds, which was
their substance, freely up and down; and this Abraham did, in a country where
he was a stranger. Whence it is
plain, that at least a great part of the land lay in common; that the
inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed property in any more than they made use
of. But when there was not room
enough in the same place, for their herds to feed together, they by consent, as
Abraham and Lot did, Gen. xiii.
5. separated and inlarged
their pasture, where it best liked them.
And for the same reason Esau went from his father, and his brother, and
planted in mount Seir, Gen. xxxvi. 6.
Sec. 39. And thus, without supposing any private dominion, and
property in Adam, over all the world, exclusive of all other men, which can no
way be proved, nor any one's property be made out from it; but supposing the
world given, as it was, to the children of men in common, we see how labour
could make men distinct titles to several parcels of it, for their private
uses; wherein there could be no doubt of right, no room for quarrel.
Sec. 40. Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may
appear, that the property of labour should be able to over-balance the
community of land: for it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on
every thing; and let any one consider what the difference is between an acre of
land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of
the same land lying in common, without any husbandry upon it, and he will find,
that the improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very modest computation
to say, that of the products of the earth useful to the life of man nine tenths
are the effects of labour: nay, if we will rightly estimate things as they come
to our use, and cast up the several expences about them, what in them is purely
owing to nature, and what to labour, we shall find, that in most of them
ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour.
Sec. 41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration
of any thing, than several nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich
in land, and poor in all the comforts of life; whom nature having furnished as
liberally as any other people, with the materials of plenty, i.e. a fruitful
soil, apt to produce in abundance, what might serve for food, raiment, and
delight; yet for want of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of
the conveniencies we enjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful territory there,
feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer in England. Sec.
42. To make this a little clearer,
let us but trace some of the ordinary provisions of life, through their several
progresses, before they come to our use, and see how much they receive of their
value from human industry. Bread,
wine and cloth, are things of daily use, and great plenty; yet notwithstanding,
acorns, water and leaves, or skins, must be our bread, drink and cloathing, did
not labour furnish us with these more useful commodities: for whatever bread is
more worth than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk, than leaves, skins
or moss, that is wholly owing to labour and industry; the one of these being
the food and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other,
provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us, which how much they
exceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he will then see how
much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this
world: and the ground which produces the materials, is scarce to be reckoned
in, as any, or at most, but a very small part of it; so little, that even
amongst us, land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of
pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we
shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing.
This shews how much numbers of men are to be preferred to
largeness of dominions; and that the increase of lands, and the right employing
of them, is the great art of government: and that prince, who shall be so wise
and godlike, as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and
encouragement to the honest industry of mankind, against the oppression of
power and narrowness of party, will quickly be too hard for his neighbours: but
this by the by. To return to the
argument in hand,
Sec. 43. An acre of land, that bears here twenty bushels of wheat,
and another in America, which, with the same husbandry, would do the like, are,
without doubt, of the same natural intrinsic value: but yet the benefit mankind
receives from the one in a year, is worth 5l. and from the other possibly not worth a penny, if all the
profit an Indian received from it were to be valued, and sold here; at least, I
may truly say, not one thousandth.
It is labour then which puts the greatest part of value upon land,
without which it would scarcely be worth any thing: it is to that we owe the
greatest part of all its useful products; for all that the straw, bran, bread,
of that acre of wheat, is more worth than the product of an acre of as good
land, which lies waste, is all the effect of labour: for it is not barely the
plough-man's pains, the reaper's and thresher's toil, and the baker's sweat, is
to be counted into the bread we eat; the labour of those who broke the oxen,
who digged and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and framed the timber
employed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils, which are a vast
number, requisite to this corn, from its being feed to be sown to its being
made bread, must all be charged on the account of labour, and received as an
effect of that: nature and the earth furnished only the almost worthless
materials, as in themselves. It
would be a strange catalogue of things, that industry provided and made use of,
about every loaf of bread, before it came to our use, if we could trace them;
iron, wood, leather, bark, timber, stone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dying
drugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes, and all the materials made use of in the ship,
that brought any of the commodities made use of by any of the workmen, to any
part of the work; all which it would be almost impossible, at least too long,
to reckon up.
Sec. 44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of
nature are given in common, yet man, by being master of himself, and proprietor
of his own person, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself the
great foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of what he
applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had
improved the conveniencies of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong
in common to others.
Sec. 45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property,
wherever any one was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which remained a
long while the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind makes use
of. Men, at first, for the most
part, contented themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their
necessities: and though afterwards, in some parts of the world, (where the
increase of people and stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and
so of some value) the several communities settled the bounds of their distinct
territories, and by laws within themselves regulated the properties of the
private men of their society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the
property which labour and industry began; and the leagues that have been made
between several states and kingdoms, either expresly or tacitly disowning all
claim and right to the land in the others possession, have, by common consent,
given up their pretences to their natural common right, which originally they
had to those countries, and so have, by positive agreement, settled a property
amongst themselves, in distinct parts and parcels of the earth; yet there are
still great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof not
having joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of their
common money) lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it do, or
can make use of, and so still lie in common; tho' this can scarce happen amongst
that part of mankind that have consented to the use of money.
Sec. 46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of
man, and such as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world
look after, as it cloth the Americans now, are generally things of short
duration; such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay and perish of
themselves: gold, silver and diamonds, are things that fancy or agreement hath
put the value on, more than real use, and the necessary support of life. Now of those good things which nature
hath provided in common, every one had a right (as hath been said) to as much
as he could use, and property in all that he could effect with his labour; all
that his industry could extend to, to alter from the state nature had put it
in, was his. He that gathered a
hundred bushels of acorns or apples, had thereby a property in them, they were
his goods as soon as gathered. He
was only to look, that he used them before they spoiled, else he took more than
his share, and robbed others. And
indeed it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he
could make use of. If he gave away
a part to any body else, so that it perished not uselesly in his possession,
these he also made use of. And if
he also bartered away plums, that would have rotted in a week, for nuts that
would last good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not
the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of goods that belonged to
others, so long as nothing perished uselesly in his hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a
piece of metal, pleased with its colour; or exchange his sheep for shells, or
wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep those by him all his life he
invaded not the right of others, he might heap up as much of these durable
things as he pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his just property not
lying in the largeness of his possession, but the perishing of any thing
uselesly in it.
Sec. 47. And thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that
men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in
exchange for the truly useful, but perishable supports of life.
Sec. 48. And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men
possessions in different proportions, so this invention of money gave them the
opportunity to continue and enlarge them: for supposing an island, separate
from all possible commerce with the rest of the world, wherein there were but
an hundred families, but there were sheep, horses and cows, with other useful
animals, wholsome fruits, and land enough for corn for a hundred thousand times
as many, but nothing in the island, either because of its commonness, or
perishableness, fit to supply the place of money; what reason could any one
have there to enlarge his possessions beyond the use of his family, and a
plentiful supply to its consumption, either in what their own industry
produced, or they could
barter for like perishable, useful commodities, with others? Where there is not some thing, both
lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there men will not be apt
to enlarge their possessions of land, were it never so rich, never so free for
them to take: for I ask, what would a man value ten thousand, or an hundred
thousand acres of excellent land, ready cultivated, and well stocked too with
cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of America, where he had no hopes of
commerce with other parts of the world, to draw money to him by the sale of the
product? It would not be worth the
enclosing, and we should see him give up again to the wild common of nature,
whatever was more than would supply the conveniencies of life to be had there
for him and his family.
Sec. 49. Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and more so
than that is now; for no such thing as money was any where known. Find out something that hath the use
and value of money amongst his neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin
presently to enlarge his possessions.
Sec. 50. But
since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man in proportion to
food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the consent of men,
whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the measure, it is plain, that men
have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth, they
having, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out, a way how a man may fairly
possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in
exchange for the overplus gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without
injury to any one; these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the
possessor. This partage of things
in an inequality of private possessions, men have made practicable out of the
bounds of society, and without compact, only by putting a value on gold and
silver, and tacitly agreeing in the use of money: for in governments, the laws
regulate the right of property, and the possession of land is determined by
positive constitutions.
Sec. 51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive, without any
difficulty, how labour could at first begin a title of property in the common
things of nature, and how the spending it upon our uses bounded it. So that there could then be no reason
of quarrelling about title, nor any doubt about the largeness of possession it
gave. Right and conveniency went
together; for as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon, so
he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of. This left no room for controversy about
the title, nor for encroachment on the right of others; what portion a man
carved to himself, was easily seen; and it was useless, as well as dishonest,
to carve himself too much, or take more than he needed.
CHAP. VIII: Of the Beginning of Political Societies
Sec. 119. Every man being, as has been shewed, naturally free, and
nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but only his
own consent; it is to be considered, what shall be understood to be a sufficient
declaration of a man's consent, to make him subject to the laws of any
government. There is a common
distinction of an express and a tacit consent, which will concern our present
case. No body doubts but an
express consent, of any man entering into any society, makes him a perfect
member of that society, a subject of that government. The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit
consent, and how far it binds, i.e.
how far any one shall be looked on to have consented, and thereby
submitted to any government, where he has made no expressions of it at
all. And to this I say, that every
man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of
any government, cloth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged
to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one
under it; whether this his possession be of land, to him and his heirs for
ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely
on the highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one
within the territories of that government.
Sec. 120. To understand this the better, it is fit to consider, that
every man, when he at first incorporates himself into any commonwealth, he, by
his uniting himself thereunto, annexed also, and submits to the community,
those possessions, which he has, or shall acquire, that do not already belong
to any other government: for it would be a direct contradiction, for any one to
enter into society with others for the securing and regulating of property; and
yet to suppose his land, whose property is to be regulated by the laws of the
society, should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government, to which he
himself, the proprietor of the land, is a subject. By the same act therefore, whereby any one unites his
person, which was before free, to any common-wealth, by the same he unites his
possessions, which were before free, to it also; and they become, both of them,
person and possession, subject to the government and dominion of that
common-wealth, as long as it hath a being. VVhoever therefore, from thenceforth, by inheritance,
purchase, permission, or otherways, enjoys any part of the land, so annexed to,
and under the government of that common-wealth, must take it with the condition
it is under; that is, of submitting to the government of the common-wealth,
under whose jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any subject of it.
Sec. 121. But since the government has a direct jurisdiction only over
the land, and reaches the possessor of it, (before he has actually incorporated
himself in the society) only as he dwells upon, and enjoys that; the obligation
any one is under, by virtue of such enjoyment, to submit to the government,
begins and ends with the enjoyment; so that whenever the owner, who has given
nothing but such a tacit consent to the government, will, by donation, sale, or
otherwise, quit the said possession, he is at liberty to go and incorporate
himself into any other common-wealth; or to agree with others to begin a new
one, in vacuis locis, in any part of the world, they can find free and
unpossessed: whereas he, that has once, by actual agreement, and any express
declaration, given his consent to be of any common-
wealth, is perpetually and
indispensably obliged to be, and remain unalterably a subject to it, and can
never be again in the liberty of the state of nature; unless, by any calamity,
the government he was under comes to be dissolved; or else by some public act
cuts him off from being any longer a member of it.
Sec. 122. But submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly,
and enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member of
that society: this is only a local protection and homage due to and from all
those, who, not being in a state of war, come within the territories belonging
to any government, to all parts whereof the force of its laws extends. But this no more makes a man a member
of that society, a perpetual subject of that common-wealth, than it would make
a man a subject to another, in whose family he found it convenient to abide for
some time; though, whilst he continued in it, he were obliged to comply with
the laws, and submit to the government he found there. And thus we see, that foreigners, by
living all their lives under another government, and enjoying the privileges
and protection of it, though they are bound, even in conscience, to submit to
its administration, as far forth as any denison; yet do not thereby come to be subjects
or members of that common-
wealth. Nothing can make any man so, but his
actually entering into it by positive engagement, and express promise and
compact. This is that, which I
think, concerning the beginning of political societies, and that consent which
makes any one a member of any common-wealth.
CHAP. IX: Of the Ends of Political Society and Government. ***********
Sec. 123.
IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be
absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and
subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give up this
empire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any other
power? To which it is obvious to
answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the
enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of
others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater
part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property
he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however
free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason,
that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are
already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their
lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.
Sec. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of
their property. To which in the
state of nature there are many things wanting. First, There wants an
established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the
standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies
between them: for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all
rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as
ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding
to them in the application of it to their particular cases.
Sec. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and
indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the
established law: for every one in that state being both judge and executioner
of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is
very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as
well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other
men's.
Sec. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to
back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution, They
who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force
to make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment
dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.
CHAP XI: Of the extent of the Legislative Power.
Sec. 142. These are the bounds which the trust,
that is put in them by the society, and the law of God and nature, have set to
the legislative power of every common-wealth, in all forms of government.
First, They are to govern by promulgated
established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule
for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country man at plough.
Secondly, These laws also ought to be
designed for no other end ultimately, but the good of the people.
Thirdly, They must not raise taxes on the
property of the people, without the consent of the people, given by themselves,
or their deputies. And this
properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in
being, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the
legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves.
Fourthly, The legislative neither must nor
can transfer the power of making laws to any body else, or place it any where,
but where the people have.
CHAP. III: Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Common-wealth.
Sec. 149. THOUGH in a constituted common-wealth, standing upon its own
basis, and acting according to its own nature, that is, acting for the preservation
of the community, there can be but one supreme power, which is the legislative,
to which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet the legislative being
only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the
people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the
legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them: for all power given with
trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is
manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and
the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew
where they shall think best for their safety and security. And thus the community perpetually
retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of
any body, even of their legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish, or so
wicked, as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of
the subject: for no man or society of men, having a power to deliver up their
preservation, or consequently the means of it, to the absolute will and
arbitrary dominion of another; when ever any one shall go about to bring them
into such a slavish condition, they will always have a right to preserve, what
they have not a power to part with; and to rid themselves of those, who invade
this fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of self-preservation, for which
they entered into society. And
thus the community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power,
but not as considered under any form of government, because this power of the
people can never take place till the government be dissolved.
CHAP. XIV: Of prerogative.